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Federalism Values and Foreign Relations
Michael S. Greve*
In attacking the orthodox view of an exclusive, incontestable federal monopoly
over foreign relations, Edward T. Swaine argues, revisionist scholars have so far failed
to address the "ultimate challenge [of] locating new functions and values for the states
in a globalized, yet federal, world.' Both the criticism and the underlying intuition
strike me as substantially correct. The revisionist attempt to rehabilitate federalism
and the states presupposes that federalism serves some important value or values. In
light of the momentous changes wrought by a global, interconnected world, those
values cannot simply be assumed; they have to be identified and defended.
That said, Swaine's proposed search for "new functions and values" seems
needlessly ambitious. The central dynamics of globalization-increased international
mobility of capital and labor, international treaty arrangements that reach deep into
formerly domestic affairs, the operation of domestic corporations on a global scale
and, conversely, of foreign corporations in home state markets-do, of course, compel
a re-thinking of domestic arrangements. Still, it seems likely that the "new" federalism
values and functions will be extensions and modifications of the old ones. The real
question is whether a globalized world renders familiar features of federalism more
functional and valuable, or less so.
One set of traditional federalism values that might be thought to gain increased
currency in a globalized world revolves around political participation. States have
traditionally been viewed as being "closer to the people" than the national government.
Now that the forces and institutions that shape our lives are even more distant, alien,
and unresponsive, it has become all the more important to cultivate and protect local
attachments, mores, policies, and voices.2  An enhanced role for the states in
international affairs on issues that might affect their citizens could improve the
recognition and representation of local values, interests, and concerns.
* John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; PhD, (Government), Cornell Uniersity.
1987.
1. EdwardT. Swaine, The Undersea World ofForeign Relations Federalism, 2 ChiJ Ind L 337.354(2001).
2. See, for example, J. Harvie Willinson, III, Federalism for tle Future, 74 S Cal L PC%, 523, 523-24
(2001).
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An alternative set of traditional federalism values center around the benefits of
jurisdictional diversity and competition. Jurisdictional diversity makes it possible to
accommodate a wider range of citizen-consumer preferences more of the time.
Competition among governments, coupled with the option of an "exit" for dissatisfied
citizens and businesses, disciplines interest group politics. On this view, federalism
merits preservation (or restoration) against national and international arrangements
alike, for substantially the same reasons. Federalism merits a firm defense especially
now that international arrangements provide revenue-hungry governments and rent-
seeking interest groups with enhanced opportunities to trump the salutary,
disciplining force ofjurisdictional competition.
Space constraints mercifully preclude anything resembling the full development
of these two lines of argument and their implications for constitutional law and
doctrine. The remainder of this article sketches the basic intuitions and presumptions
that might inform a future analysis.
I strongly suspect that the "local participation" story is ultimately implausible.
As an initial matter, the successful cultivation of local attachments does not appear to
correspond, in any systematic way, to constitutional federalism arrangements. (It
seems to work better in centralized France than in some federalist countries.) Even if
that assessment is mistaken, the notion that local politics and participation might
compensate for global alienation and dislocations is open to serious question. On
some issues, more leeway for state governments would arguably help to counter civic
alienation. By way of prominent example, the citizens of Massachusetts might feel
better about themselves and their role in the world if they were permitted to register
their disapproval of the government of Burma and corporations that deal with the
SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council, or whatever that country and its
junta may now be called).' For the most part, however, globalization's discontents
arise from sources that are beyond the reach of state governments, and citizens' sense
of having lost control over some aspects of their lives cannot easily be compensated
through more participation in some other venues and walks of life. Citizens whose
401(k) investments take a nosedive, courtesy of Indonesian kleptocrats or the
International Monetary Fund, are unlikely to be mollified by opportunities for
meaningful civic involvement on or with the Richmond city council or the Roanoke
school board.
The "diversity-and-competition" story, in contrast, seems quite compelling.
Federalism's point, as this version of the story has it, is not to give citizens and their
state and local governments a greater voice; rather, federalism's point is to preserve
citizens' choice among competing sovereigns and their right to exit oppressive
jurisdictions by voting with their feet, their modems, and their pocketbooks. Modern
3. See Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000).
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technologies have greatly reduced the costs of exercising exit rights, thus rendering
their disciplining force much more powerful. That is why jurisdictional competition
is a much more salient and attractive notion now than it was, say, in the nineteenth
century.
This intuition is somewhat at odds with the conventional globalization story.
Increased international complexity and interdependence are commonly taken to
entail: (a) greater cultural and economic homogeneity; (b) greater interdependence
and complexity, especially in economic and environmental matters; and (c)
accordingly, a substantially greater need for global cooperation and economic and
environmental management (through international organizations, agreements, or
some other means). Excellent theoretical and practical reasons, however, provide
ample cause for skepticism about the conventional move from (b) to (c), that is, the
notion that increased complexity and interdependence necessitate more central
political intervention.
Scholars in the tradition of Friedrich A. Hayek are bound to argue that increased
complexity, on a larger scale, is a powerful argument against political centralization,
not for it. 4  Since the rigidities, inefficiencies, and unintended consequences of
government regulation increase with the scale and complexity of the regulated subject
matter, the idea of managing the world as a global commons is absurd. By the same
token, increased international interdependence arguably renders political borders
more, rather than less, important. The thought (or the slogan) of a "world without
borders" becomes rather unappealing, once one recognizes that a world without
borders is a world without exits. Free citizens and free markets need exits. The world
needs no tax "harmonization"; it needs and wants the tax havens that the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is trying to wipe out.
Admittedly, this line of argument cuts primarily in favor of diversity and
competition among countries or nation-states, and only secondarily and incidentally
in favor of domestic federalism. Some of those secondary considerations, however, are
quite persuasive.
(a) More competition is better. So, for example, international competition
between the United States and foreign countries for the location of
automobile plants is a good thing. It is even better, however, if South
Carolina can compete with Ohio, Michigan, Canada, and the rest of the
world by offering BMW a deep sea port, right-to-work laws, and state
troopers who care little about drivers who mistake the interstate highway
system near Spartanburg for the Autobahn.
4. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Simple Ruls for a Cmlex World (Harvard 1995).
5. For a discussion of OECD policy, see Lubna Kably, Haver on Earth? You Can Fcrja It ifOECD Has
Its Way, The Economic Times (Nov 26, 1999).
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(b) Domestic federalism may set precedents or provide competitive models that
can be scaled internationally. For example, successful and highly efficient
state competition for corporate chartering6 demonstrates why international
agreements on corporate chartering should probably take the form of
reciprocal recognition of domestic charters rather than harmonizing
standards. For another example, successful federalist regulation of internet
privacy and consumer marketing information here in the United States might
well show that appropriate choice-of-law and contractual rules are preferable
to an international regulatory "privacy" cartel.
7
(c) A robust federalism may help to protect domestic diversity and competition
against efforts to utilize international agreements as a means of bringing
domestic "outlier" states in line with the aspirations of national elites and
interest groups. The menace of international "policy laundering" is
particularly acute in Europe, where regions rightly suspect that national
policy elites are deliberately using the presumed demand for European
integration as a means of undermining regional autonomy. The same
concern, however, also applies in the United States, where the 2000
presidential election provided fresh evidence of a pronounced cultural divide
that, to a remarkable extent, maps state lines. Most of the states that elected
President George W. Bush-the Republican "sea of red" on the electoral
map-administer the death penalty, some of them to minors. None permit
homosexual unions. Many lack hate speech laws and "comparable worth"
statutes. All of them lack much of the stuff that is now the warp and woof of
international human rights covenants and conventions. The Democratic
states, on average, conform more thoroughly to emerging international norms,
and perhaps these states are more enlightened. Above a threshold of truly
universal human rights guarantees (which all of the American states meet),
however, citizen choice and jurisdictional diversity are vastly preferable to
international regimentation.
What follows from competitive federalism values and priorities at the level of
constitutional doctrine? Competitive federalism demands firm barriers against the
imposition of centralizing international norms (whether through treaties, customary
international law, or some other vehicle) on the states. Conversely, though somewhat
6. See Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI 1993).
7. Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, A Recipe for Cookies: State Regulation of Consumer Marketing
Information 25-31 available online at
<http://www.federalismproject.org/conlaw/ecommerce/cookies.pdf> (visited Sept 30, 2001).
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less obviously, it implies fairly tight and, if you will, "nationalist" restrictions on the
states' participation in international politics and against the extra-territorial projection
of state sovereignty outside the ordinary, domestic channels of political participation.'
The task of translating these general presumptions into constitutional doctrine
ought to be approached with considerable caution. First, as Swaine observes, the
constitutional context of foreign affairs federalism is poorly understood.9 Extending
that observation, one must say that many of federalism's constitutional doctrines and
their basic applications are poorly developed and poorly understood even in the
domestic context. Far from confounding a well-settled body of doctrine and
precedent, foreign affairs issues add another layer of confusion. Second, the
preservation (or, more precisely in the contemporary context, the restoration) of a
competitive, "market-preserving" federalism is a very difficult endeavorU It is not
simply a matter of appropriate legal and constitutional arrangements, but rather
involves basic questions of social stratification, interest group constellations and
alignments, and the range and intensity of social, ideological, and ethnic conflict."
One can say with some confidence, though, that competitive federalism requires,
as a necessary condition, the existence of constitutional, judicially enforceable (and
politically tenable) limitations on the national government's powers. Absent such
limitations, the national government will consistently and successfully accede to
insistent demands for the suppression of state competition. This problem marks the
constitutional battle ground of "enumerated powers" and, in particular, the Article I
powers which, when interpreted with suitable generosity, enable Congress to
circumvent the limitations that the constitutional text seems to impose. These
enumerated powers are, prominently, the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause,
and, according to the traditional view, the treaty power.
At this particular front, foreign affairs federalism issues actually seem somewhat
more manageable, both as a doctrinal and as a practical matter, than the
8. The reverse priority of values-that is, an endorsement of a 'civic participation" federalism-
probably implies a reverse set of constitutional presumptions.
9. Swaine, 2 ChiJ Intl L at 339 (cited in note 1).
10. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economnic Role of Political Institutions: MarhetPreenrmg Fedcralsm ar
Economic Development, 11 J L Econ & Org 1 (1995); Barry R. Weingasr, Censutuns as Gerr.anrse
Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J Inst & Theorer Econ 286 (1993)
(describing necessary features of a market-preserving federalism); Jonathan Rodden and Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 Va L Rev 1521 (1997) (arguing that marker-
preserving federalism is inherently unstable).
11. See Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, 83 Va L Rev at 1521 (cited in note 10). For my own humble
efforts to identify (domestic) political conditions and dynamics that might facilitate competitive
federalism, see Michael S. Greve, Real Federalism: WhIy It Matters, How It Could HarE (AEI 1999).
12. The Necessary and Proper Clause, US Const Art I, § 8, d 18, the usual suspect in the search for
sources of presumed congressional omnipotence, is not listed in the text because it is nor normally
viewed as an independent grant of power.
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corresponding domestic issues. Revisionists have urged a reconsideration of the
doctrine of Missouri v Holland."3 At the limit, the revisionist view pushes toward a set
of rules that preclude the national government from doing to the states through
international arrangements what it may not do to them under its domestic
enumerated powers. The historical, textual, and conceptual arguments for this view
are substantially better developed, and to my mind more persuasive, than are the
analogous, embryonic attempts to develop a coherent theory that would limit
congressional power under the Spending Clause. 4 As a practical matter, moreover, it
seems quite feasible to defend the principle that the national government may not
"internationalize" its way around domestic constitutional constraints. In contrast, the
analogous principle that Congress may not spend its way around those constraints is,
notwithstanding its honorable Madisonian origin and pedigree, a political
impossibility. Spending its way around constitutional limitations is what Congress
does for a living, and one cannot easily articulate a line that would circumscribe that
power without laying waste to the entire administrative state.
In addition to enforceable limitations on the national government's authority, a
federalism that values jurisdictional diversity and competition requires doctrines that
curtail both state protectionism and the extraterritorial projection of state sovereignty.
Competitive federalism's central problem is not the threat of national impositions and
"unfunded mandates" on states, but rather the states' demand for national
intervention. 5 Progressive, intervention-minded states face the constant challenge of
accommodating powerful domestic interest groups. They seek to meet that challenge
by exporting the costs of their regulatory regimes and by insisting on national
"harmonization." While these strategies, when successful, may in some sense enhance
"participatory' federalism values, they undermine competitive federalism. They do so,
for example, by vitiating both the anti-interventionist states' policy choices and the
citizens' ability to choose, from many diverse and competing states, the regime that
best suits them.
While these considerations apply to federalism in general (prior to and
independent from any globalization and foreign affairs complications), they supply an
additional reason (additional, that is, to the traditional "one voice" rationale for a
13. For revisionist arguments that Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416 (1920), may and should be
reexamined, see, for example, Jeremy Rabkin, Why Sovereignty Matters 69-76 (AEI 1998); Thomas
Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 Colum L Rev
1726 (1998); Robert Knowles, Comment, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to
Globalization, 95 Nw U L Rev 735 (2001).
14. See, for example, Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum L Rev 1911
(1995); Ryan C. Squire, Comment, Effectuating Principles of Federalism: Reevaluating the Federal Spending
Power as the Great Tenth Amendment Loophole, 25 Pepperdine L Rev 869 (1997-98).
15. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public
Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 Vand L Rev 1355 (1993) (showing that unfunded
mandates are responses to interest group demands).
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federal foreign affairs monopoly) to be skeptical of a larger state role in international
affairs. If the recent past is prologue, it is only a matter of time before the National
Governors Association or the Union of Concerned States shows up at an
international meeting to lobby alongside the usual interest group claimants for some
international labor or environmental agreement. That commitment, in rum, can serve
as a means of leveraging the states' demands in Washington, DC.If Of course (one
might object), the states already possess ample opportunities and institutional
channels to press their demands for anti-competitive national legislation. That,
though, is precisely the point: given that there are numerous domestic,
constitutionally envisioned means through which intervention-minded states may
seek to have their way, it seems ill-advised to provide them with an additional,
international, extra-constitutional platform.17
At the constitutional level, this line of thought counsels adherence to some
"nationalist" legal doctrines, such as a fairly rigid interpretation of the Foreign
Compacts Clause and a per se prohibition against facially discriminatory state action
under the Commerce Clause, foreign and domestic. At the same time, competitive
foreign affairs federalism should prompt more careful thought about doctrines that we
currently lack-prominently, coherent rules and doctrines concerning state "exports"
of regulatory and tax burdens, from products liability law to the taxation of interstate
transactions. In this horizontal dimension, federalism's constitutional and sub-
constitutional rules (such as conflicts and choice-of-law) are in considerable disrepair.
in part because the policing of interstate regulatory aggression has been viewed as
principally a congressional obligation; in other part because the post-New Deal
judiciary believed that enforceable limits on state "experiments' that impose costs on
outside parties would leave insufficient room for interest group politics.
It should therefore come as no surprise that international complaints over US
domestic, state-based trade distortions have increasingly targeted state regulatory
aggressions (as distinct from protectionism), such as state unitary taxation of foreign-
based multinational corporations" and more recently, Mississippi's tort law and
16. The Union of Concerned States does not exist-yet. The phenomenon of concerted state lobbying
on an international stage, however, is already a reality. See Edward T. Sv.aine Negiriarng Fedcra!zsm
State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 Duke L J 1127, 1130-32 (1999); Kobayashi and
Ribstein, A Recipefor Cookies (cited in note 7).
17. In defense of a larger state role, one might argue that the national government cannot always, be
relied on to represent the states in international negotiations. That objection raizes large and
important questions. Those questions, however, go to the domestic arrangements concerning the
organization and exercise of foreign affairs powers, as distinct from the state' indpendent
participation on the international stage.
18. See Barclays Bank PLC v Francbise Tax Bd, 512 US 298 (1994).
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California's fuel additive regulations. 9 The time may have come to rethink the extant
substantive and procedural rules that facilitate state regulatory aggression. In this, as
in many other respects, globalization presents an opportunity for federalism, rather
than a threat. Nothing would be lost if international agreements and obligations were
interpreted and enforced to curtail the mischievous state exports of regulatory and tax
burdens that we have come to tolerate. The need to harmonize domestic
arrangements with international trade obligations may even prompt us to revisit and
reform, at long last, domestic federalism norms and arrangements that are flatly
inconsistent with competitive structures and values. Our hopelessly dysfunctional
and quite probably unconstitutional choice-of-law regime would be an excellent place
to start.
Globalization is highly unlikely to serve states' rights values of empowering
states. It may, however, serve the federalist objective of disciplining government at all
levels, including the state level. If that hope makes me a nationalist, then I am a proud
nationalist.
19. See Joseph A. McKinney, Created From NAFTA: The Structure. Function and Significance of the Treaty's
Related Institutions 229-30 (ME Sharpe 2000) (noting vulnerability of "traditional" areas of state
policyrnaking to international rulemaking and adjudication).
20. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of
Choice of Law, 92 Colum L Rev 249 (1992).
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